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The Rise and Fall of the Booster Ethos
in Dubuque, 1850-1861
TIMOTHY R. MAHONEY
ON THE AFTERNOON of July 18, 1855, the citizens of Du-
buque, Iowa, and "distinguished" railroad excursionists from
across the region gathered at a "barbeque picrùc" on a hill
above town to celebrate the completion of the Illinois Central
Railroad to Durüeith, Illinois, the town just across the river from
Dubuque. The picnic was the culminating event of a "railroad
festival" to mark the "new birthday" of their "beloved city of
the mines." Boosters proclaimed that Dubuque, having become
the western terminus of the system, stood at a critical moment
in its history. Now was the time for all citizens to put aside their
differences to implement a booster policy that would make Du-
buque the great emporium and metropolis of the Northwest.'
Like boosters across the urban West in the mid-1850s, EHi-
buque's leaders understood that the approach of the railroad al-
tered the dynamics of regional development and thus raised the
stakes in the competition among towns for regional hegemony.
As a result, boosters intensified their efforts to exhort towns-
people to support a booster system of improvement and rail-
road companies working together with city government to pro-
mote town development. As the cost of these efforts outstripped
1. Dubuque Express and Herald, 13,14,17,18,19,20, 22, and 27 July 1855; Robert
F. Klein, ed., Dubuque: Frontier River City (Dubuque, 1984), 130-34; George
Nightingale to George Wallace Jones, 15 May 1856, George Wallace Jones Pa-
pers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
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private and local resources, however, it became increasingly
clear that public funding would be needed. So boosters broad-
ened their rhetoric. Instead of arguing on the basis of mere eco-
nomic self-interest, they began to tie urban development to a
social and cultural vision of their town's future. If townspeople
would unite behind booster policy based on their common in-
terests, the boosters argued, they could create a self-sufficient
regional urban center that would promote prosperity and har-
mony for all townspeople. Enthralled by this ideology, towns-
people across the region opened public coffers and transformed
boosters into a social and cultural oligarchy that sought to order
and control local life. In doing so between 1856 and 1860, they
put town unity to the test—particularly in the wake of the Panic
of 1857—and unwittingly undermined the booster system and
the towns they had worked so hard to promote.^
In Dubuque as elsewhere, the town boosters' credentials for
leadership were well established. Many were among the "early
settlers" who had participated in local government, politics, and
the legal system. They had founded associations, institutions,
and churches while developing a downtown business culture.
Meanwhile, many boosters had cultivated middle-class gentility
to establish a secure social position. In the course of navigating
between their private sodal lives and public interactions in the
course of their everyday business activities, they had learned
hoviT to employ the discourse and behaviors of gentility and
collective sociability among lawyers, businessmen, and mem-
bers of a broader male subculture to suppress conflict and break
down entrenched private social, political, and cultural interests
and attitudes within various groups in town. Now, as boosters
articulating a social vision, they sought to fuse elements of
middle-class gentility, the downtown business culture, and local
immigrant subcultures into a unified booster ethos that would
2. Carl Abbott, "Boosterism," Encyclopedia of Urban America, 2 vols. (Santa
Barbara, CA, 1998), 1:89-90; idem. Boosters and Businessmen: Popular Economic
Thought and Urban Groivth in the Antebellum Middle West (Wesport, CT, 1981);
David Hamer, New Towns in the New World: Images and Perceptions of the Nine-
teenth-Century Urban Frontier (New York, 1990); Robin Einhorn, Property Rules:
Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-J872 (Chicago, 1991), 28-60; Robert H. Wiebe,
The Opening of American Society (New York, 1984), 290.
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support the "booster system."^ Their success would deper\d on
how well the key representatives of a town's predominant sub-
cultures—"genteel society," the naale subculture of politics and
JVIain Street, and immigrant culture—were able to ease tensions,
work together, and promote unity/ Representing these subcul-
tures in Dubuque were, respectively, the Langworthy brothers,
George Wallace Jones, and Richard Bonson.
AS THE "FOUNDING FATHERS" of Dubuque, the Lang-
worthys were the foundation of Dubuque's "good society."
They were so much "identified with the history of Dubuque"
that their biographies were, as one county history claimed, "the
history of our city."^ James, Edward, and Lucius Langworthy,
who began mining in the area even before it was opened for
settlement in 1833, were among the "first settlers" to arrive at
Dubuque. A fourth brother, Solon, joined them in 1834. Striking
rich lodes of lead in Couler valley, the Langworthy brothers
quickly gained control of mining and smelting in town. In 1836
the brothers pooled their resources and formed a partnership,
James L. Langworthy and Brothers. The company operated
mines and smelting furnaces up Langworthy Hollow and the
Maquoketa Little Creek valley and ran a land agency, mercantile
emporium, and bank on lower Main Street. By the mid-1850s the
Langworthys "owned . . . the most valuable lands in and about
the city." As bankers, they carefully chose their loans and in-
vestments, dealt only in specie, and were "not much obliged to
3. Timothy R. Mahoney, Provincial Lives: Middle Class Experience in the Antebel-
lum Middle West (New York, 1999). This discussion draws from and contributes
to a debate about the nature of political and social interaction within an emerg-
ing public sphere in nineteenth-century American cities and towns. See Philip
J. Ethington, TIK Public City: The Political Construction of Urban Life in San Fran-
cisco, 1850-^1900 (New York, 1994); Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and
Public Lifa in the American City during the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, CA,
1997); and Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans
and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ, 2000).
4. Timothy R. Mahoney, " 'A Common Band of Brotherhood': The Booster
Ethos, Male Subcultures, and the Origins of Urban Social Order in the Mid-
west of the 1840s," loumal of Urban History 25 (1999), 619-46.
5. C. C. Childs, The History of Dubuque County, him (Chicago, 1880), 830; Lucius
H. Langworthy to George Wallace Jones, 4 January 1855, George Wallace Jones
Papers.
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The Langworthy brothers, left to right, here and on facing page, and in
order of age, eldest to youngest: James, Lucius, Edward, and Solon.
From History of Dubuque County (1880).
anybody." In 1856 the Langworthys were the richest men in
town, each worth a few million dollars in today's terms, paying
together about one-twelfth of the town's taxes."
Not surprisingly, the Langworthys developed a proprietary
relationship with the townspeople. Often viewing Dubuque as
their town, they considered their interests as identical with the
city's. The Langworthys were among the settlers who founded
the town of Dubuque, laid out the town plat, purchased and
sold real estate, and improved numerous streets in town in 1834.
Later they invested in steamboats and ferries to enhance their
mercantile trade and Dubuque's role as a mercantile center. As
men "of foresight [they] were keenly alive to everything which
could build up a city," and "as "citizen[s]" were "ever open to
aid the material prosperity of Dubuque." They were generous
6. "Autobiographical Sketch of Solon M. Langworthy," Iowa jotimal of History
and Politics 8 (1910), 335; Iowa Credit Report Ledger 31, R. G. Dun and Com-
pany Collection, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Admini-
stration, Cambridge, MA; William Franklin Langworthy, comp.. The Langwor-
thy Family: Some Descendants of Andreio and Rachel Langworthy (Hamilton, NY,
1940), 262.
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"friends of schools and churches" and were involved in build-
ing the first school in Iowa. Their sense of civic duty drew the
Langworthys into public service. Lucius served as the county's
first sheriff and stood up to the ruffian "border society" in the
young mining settlement. James helped establish the first rules
regarding mining claims in 1830, and in the 1840s served on the
committee that administered the transfer of lands from the gov-
ernment into private hands. Edward served as town trustee in
1838 and three times as alderman. In general, though, the Lang-
worthys preferred to exert influence as private citizens and
boosters/
The Langworthys stood at the center of a group of early set-
tlers who sought to align their interests with those of the town.
Both Lucius and Edward became active and prominent boosters.
They made speeches, wrote articles, and published pamphlets
admonishing townspeople to formulate policies that would
make their town a "future metropolis," a new "Athens of the
West/' and "the pride of the Mississippi valley." Throughout
their lives in Dubuque, the Langworthys had far more resources
at their disposal than the town did. Thus they were called upon
regularly to support public activities. In some ways, the Lang-
7. Childs, History of Dubuque County, 828,831.
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worthys became a proprietary shadow government behind the
official elected powers, using their own "means and credit" to
build the city.*
Yet the Langworthys were somewhat reluctant to exert in-
fiuence within the emerging booster ethos. Their wealth in lead
mining and land declined in value after the lead mining indus-
try peaked and then declined in the 1840s. This limited their
ability to raise capital or attract outside capital to town and in-
tensified their desire to rely on their own resources. Politically,
the Langworthys stood independently outside the local Demo-
cratic political culture. Socially, the four brothers and their families
sequestered themselves in a small set within the town's genteel
society that others might emulate but relatively few could enter.
The Langworthy houses, built in a cluster outside of town in the
1840s and above the town on the bluffs in the 1850s, reflected an
aloof, proprietary sense of entitlement and noblesse oblige. On
"Langworthy Bluff/' they created in the 1850s a private "Lang-
worthy society" to which only a select set of genteel residents
gained access through a restricted system of calls, teas, and par-
ties. Given their narrow set of social relations, the Lang>vorthys'
influence in the affairs of elite churches, societies, associations,
and insfitutions was limited. Likewise, the Langworthys lacked
access via the male subculture or the adjacent culture of the
bench and bar to broader social and political influence. This
circumscribed their ability to promote unity and speak for the
public good."
TWO MILES WEST of Langworthy Bluff, in a village settled
in the 1830s by immigrants fi-om Swaledale, Yorkshire, Richard
Bonson lived in a world defined by its opposition to the Lang-
8. Lucius H. Langworthy, "Dubuque: Its History, Mines, Indian Legends, Etc.,"
Ioiva journal of History and Politics 8 (1910), 422; Childs, History of Dubuque
County, 828.
9. Solon Langworthy, Diary, 12 January 1861, State Historical Society of Iowa,
Iowa City; Dubuque Weekly Tribune. 3 July 1850; Carl H. Johnson, Heritage of
Dubuque: An Architectural View {Dubuque, 1975), 19-20; David Singal, "Mod-
ernist Culture in America: Introduction," American Quarterly 39 (1987), 7-25;
Richard L. Bushman, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities (New
York, 1992), 406-13, 319-35; Mahoney, Provincial Uves, 131-34,163-67.
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worthy society. Bonson and a handful of Yorkshire men had fol-
lowed the Langworthys from southwestern Wisconsin to Du-
buque. Recognizing the advantage the Langworthys had ac-
quired in Langworthy Hollow, Bonson staked his fortune in Üie
Catfish Creek valley to the south of the village. In competition
with the Langworthys, Bonson expanded and improved his
blast furnace. Increasingly he acquired lead from fellow York-
shire miners scattered across the region. By the early 1840s, Bon-
son had purchased or claimed more than 40 tracts in the region.
Later, he extended his domain further south. He established a
smelter at Lockey Drybone and Pike's Peak mines, two of his
richest lodes. He also purchased a cluster of mining lots to the
north near the rich Karrick, Bartlett, McKenzie, Stewart, and
Burton "lodes" or "diggings," each owned by other Yorkshire
men, including John Burton, his father-in-law. This economic
system, connected to the outside through Bonson's furnaces,
and anchored socially at Center Grove, a community of a few
hundred clustered on the low ground near the headwater of the
Middle Fork of Catfish Creek, existed independently and sepa-
rately from the Langworthys' economic system.'"
Richard Bonson reinforced his autonomy from the market-
place economy through a combination of self-sufficient and lim-
ited cash crop farming. His farmhouse, built in 1853 on the hill
north of Center Grove, was the center of a network of several
other farms that Bonson worked or rented out to tenant farmers.
The production of the farms supported his and other families.
He supplemented his income with wheat sales to the Catfish
Mills in Rockdale. Bonson structured a neighborhood economy
by trading and bartering goods and produce with merchants,
other farmers, tenants, and farm hands to settle obligations, pay
rent, and buy and sell land. By 1850, as recorded in his remark-
able diary, Bor\son had settled into a regular round of excursions
to various diggings and smelters in the Catfish Creek district,
operating and managing his home and outlying farms, going to
Center Grove Methodist Church to worship on Sundays, visiting
relations and friends in the neighborhood, and regularly going
10. "Autobiographical Sketch of Solon Langworthy," 335; Childs, History of
Dubuque County, 464, 400; Deed Index, Dubuque County, Dubuque County
Courthouse, Dubuque; Plat Book of Dubuque County, Iowa (Philadelphia, 1892).
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down the road from Center Grove into lower Dubuque to at-
tend to real estate matters at the Dubuque County Courthouse.
Even though Bonson aspired to self-sufficiency, much of his
world, like that of the Langworthys and other miners, was still
driven by the logic of the marketplace. Given the scale of their
operations, he and the Langworthys were among the few to sur-
vive the shakeout in the mining industry from the late 1830s
through the mid-1840s. Bor\son joined the Langworthys on the
Mining Claims Settlement Committee that transferred public
mineral lots into private hands when the federal government
finally released for sale more than five hundred mineral lots
west of Dubuque. Many of those lots were interspersed across
Bonson's and other Yorkshire men's holdings. As they acquired
additional lots, they gained an advantage over the Langwor-
thys. Like the Langworthys, however, Bonson was squeezed by
higher production costs, declining volume, and uncertain prices
at the primary market in St. Louis. Thus, Bonson engaged in
mining and smelfing only "in intervals" in the 1850s when
prices were particularly high. As he found it more and more
difficult to justify operating, Bonson, like the Langworthys,
watched the foundation of his fortune erode. Recogrúzing that
he "must be doing something" else, Bonson, who unlike the
Langworthys was not involved in land speculation, banking,
and merchandising, retreated to farming, a self-sufficient world
of tangible w^ealth. '
Although Bonson's world was separate from the market
economy centered on Main Street and grounded by the Lar\g-
worthys, both he and the Langworthys recognized that the de-
cline in rruning threatened to undermine Dubuque's and their
own economic futures. In their attempts to align personal and
community self-interest, both were drawn into the booster ethos.
While the Langworthys' aloofness, anchored by their private
n . Timothy R. Mahoney, River Tmms in the Great West: The Structure cf PrxnñndaJ
Urbanization in the American Midwest, 1820-1870 (New York, 1990), 198-200;
Loren N. Horton, ed., 77K Character of the Country: The Iowa Diary of ¡ames L
Broderick, 1876-1877 (Iowa City, 1976), 120-21; ChUds, History of Dubuque
County, 462-64, 529; Richard Bonson, Diary, 1 January 1857, State Historical
Society of Iowa, Iowa City (original at Center for Dubuque Area History, Loras
College, Dubuque). Most of the interpretahon of Richard Bonson's life is
drawn from a dose analysis of his diary.
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Richard Bonson. From State Historical
Society oflowa, Iowa City.
family-centered social sphere, held them back, Bonson's un-
happy personal life, which undermined his social position as
patriarch of his family and leader in the immigrant community,
would push him into boosterism indirectly through politics.
Bonson's "unpleasant family affaires" [sic] resulted from an un-
happy marriage to Jane Burton. Bonson's house, instead of a
haven of genteel comfort, was a wasteland of recrimination and
discord. Proud and independent, Bor\son was too ashamed to
"open his mind to anyone on the subject." Instead, he took ref-
uge in an office that he rented on Fourth Street around the cor-
ner from Main Street. There he ran his operatior\s and became
increasingly involved in the public social life of lower Main
Street. Yet his moderate temperance views limited his interac-
tions with boosters who socialized within the male subculture
of the town, while his married "bachelor" status prevented him
from entering Dubuque's genteel "social circles."'
Nevertheless, Bonson was gradually drawn into politics
through his associations with members of the Democratic Party.
But he entered the Langworthys' economy and society reluc-
12. Bonson, Diary, 6 August 1856,9 February 1852.
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tantly He stood firm in his belief in a political economy of
autonomoiis actors, ur\fettered by government policies or re-
straints of any kind, investing their own capital without incur-
ring debt, securing contracts with a shake of the hand, and ex-
changing goods and services for cash or short-term notes
among acquaintances. To Bonson, patronage, nepotism, and
personal arrangements, rather than creating potential conflicts
of interest, insured economic actions by friendship, mutual
trust, and self-interest.
FOR BONSON, and to a lesser extent the Langworthys, the
path into the booster ethos lay through the realm of local poli-
tics and the adjacent culture of the bench and bar. In Dubuque,
the power broker at the intersection of these two realms was
George Wallace Jones. From his arrival in 1836, two years after
Bor\son and the Langworthys, Jones had been a core member of
the "fathers of the bar" elite that shaped the structure of the lo-
cal bench and bar and dominated Dubuque's Democratic Party.
Although he did not practice much law, Jones, as a Democratic
Party member, was part of a powerful group that also included
Stephen Hempstead, Warner Lewis, Thomas S. Wilson, and Pe-
ter Engle. That group controlled most of the town's litigation
and regularly received appointments to judicial or public office.
Jones was also an influential member of the "old guard" who
controlled entrance to the local bar by selectively sponsoring
newcomers, distributing cases, and structuring partnerships."
Known as "the General," Jones was skilled in cultivating cama-
raderie and fraternity. When he was home during court terms
or recesses fi-om Congress, he participated in "mock debates"
and "moot tribunals," and threw "awfully fashionable parties,"
"levees," and "dances" where lively conversation, singing,
roustabouting, "indulg[ing] . . . fiieely" in the "flowing bowl,"
and even "frolics" were often the order of the everüng. Like
other bar members, he also gave and attended "blow-outs,"
"oyster suppers," banquets, and excursions to celebrate his col-
13. A. T. Andreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas of the State of Iowa (Chicago, 1875),
424, 365-66, 368; Edward H. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches of Notable Lawyers
and Public Men of Early Iowa (Des Moines, 1916), 92-97,566-67, 816-17,819.
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George Wallace Jones. From the State
Historical Society of Iowa, lozva City.
leagues' achievements. Such events cultivated impartial profes-
sional behavior as well as solidarity and civility among men one
knew personally but against whom one competed intensely.
Through such close interactions, members of the core group
of town lawyers and judges forged deep friendships and, as
"brethren of the bar," became a "sort of a family to itself."'*
For Jones, of course, such involvement was also politics. Be-
cause members of the bar formed a pool of skill and knowledge
that provided Dubuque and northeastern Iowa with its political
leadership for a generation, Jones understood that in predomi-
nantly Democratic Dubuque, the course of town politics—and
the cliques and factions within the party—was shaped by inter-
actions among members of the local bar. Jones's appointments
as territorial judge in 1833 and then as territorial delegate to
Congress in 1835 enabled him to build a power base by giving
him access to patronage in territorial offices, which he distrib-
uted to "friends" and associates who supported him. He almost
ended his public career in 1838 by serving as a second in the
14. Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark, 21 February 1855, Lincoln Clark Papers, Hunt-
ington Library, San Marino, CA; Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, 255,17; History
of Adams County, Illinois (Chicago, 1879), 416; Mahoney, Provincial Lives, 207-11.
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infamous duel between William J. Graves and Jonathan Cilley
in Washington, D.C., but patronage saved him: in 1841 his
"friends" repaid his efforts on their behalf by getting him an
appointment as clerk of the territorial court. Jones used this po-
sition to reenter politics and, through his efforts to keep the
General Land Office in Dubuque, acquired sufficient claim to
the office to be appointed surveyor general in 1845, from which
he acquired the title "General" Jones. Fearing a Whig victory in
1848 would end his tenure as surveyor general, Jones ran for
and was elected U.S. Senator, defeating fellow Dubuque bar
member and former Iowa Supreme Court Justice Thomas S.
Wilson by a single vote in the state legislature.'''
For twelve years, Dubuque politics was shaped by Jones's
efforts to control local patronage. He reinforced his use of pa-
tronage with an aggressive social agenda and the sheer force
of his personality. The "Chesterfield gentleman" of the Senate
and Washington society, Jones established himself in Dubuque
as the "the mark and model" of local society by building a
"princely residence" along Julien Avenue on the hill above the
town in 1847. Invitations to dinners and soirees at Jones's house
were much sought after. Attendance at his levees or open
houses—where Jones, "full of flattery, buncombe, and stories,"
"facile courtesy," and excessive "bowing and scraping" pre-
vailed as the "pet of women" and the "idol of men"—was re-
quired for his supporters. Jones viewed politics as a continual
negotiation and exchange among male political "friends." He
worked tirelessly for his friends and expected them to do so for
him with unquestioned loyalty."* But his supporters were more
than mere "friends;" they were "Jones men" or, as his oppo-
15. John C. Parish, George Wallace Jones (Iowa City, 1912), 157-70, 31-35; An-
dreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas of Iowa, 365.
16. Sttles, Recollections and Sketches, 96; Augustus L. Chetlain, Recollection of
Seventy Years (Galena, 1899), 38; Parish, George Wallace Jones, vii, 32; Virginia
Clay-Clopton, A Belle of the Fifiies: Memoirs of Mrs. Clay of Alabama, Covering
Social and Political Life in Washington and the South, 1853-66 (New York, 1905),
80-81; Josiah Conzett, "My Recollections of Dubuque, Iowa, 1846 to 1890," 268,
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City; Jane Taylor to John Taylor, 7 Decem-
ber 1857, John W. Taylor Collection, New-York Historical Society, New York
City; Robert Wiebe, "Lincoln's Fraternal Democracy," in John L. Thomas, ed.,
Abraham Lincoln and the American Political Tradition (Amherst, MA, 1986), 19-21.
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George Wallace Jones hosted regular social events
for his friends and supporters at his "princely
residence" on JuUen Avenue. From the State His-
torical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.
nents charged, "Jones' tool[s]" or "sycophants." At least one of
his supporters went so far as to name a son after him. It is fair to
say that Jones's supporters surrendered their political and social
autonomy in return for personal loyalty to the man who gave
them a political identity and career.'
Almost every local Democrat's career was shaped by the
nature of his relationship with Jones. The careers of Thomas
Rogers, William Barney, Caleb Booth, Warner Lewis, Ben Sam-
uels, John J. Dyer, Lincoln Clark, and Richard Bonson were sup-
ported by Jones's political tactics and shaped by the rise and fall
of his power.'* Those who remained loyal rose and fell with
17. John J. Dyer to George Wallace Jones, 21 March 1850, George Wallace Jones
Papers; Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark, 15 December 1852, 3 January and 5 April
1853, Lincoln Clark Papers; Parish, George Wallace Jones, 280.
18. Andreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas of Iowa, 366; Stiles, Recollections and
Sketches, 819, 415, 824,161-63; William J. Bamey, Diary, 6, 8, 18,19, 23, 26, and
31 January and 24 and 27 February 1846, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa
City; W. J. Bamey to GWJ, 21 February 1849, George Wallace Jones Papers;
Childs, History of Dubuque County, 838; Richard Bonson, Diary, 1-25 December
1852,1, 7, and 8 October 1853.
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Jones. Those who steered a more independent course or op-
posed Jones moved in the opposite direction. Invariably, the in-
dependent-minded, while treated cordially by Jones in public,
were exiled from Jones's circle and denied access to political
office or party influence.
Over the years, "exiles" gradually coalesced into an opposi-
tion faction. Judge Thomas S. Wilson became Jones's first oppo-
nent when he stood agair\st Jones for the U.S. Senate in 1848
and came within one vote of defeating him. That event set off a
longstanding bitter personal erunity and prompted the emer-
gence of a Wilson faction that worked hard to defeat Jones in
the elections of 1852 and 1858. As the political feud intensified,
the opposing factior\s hardened and added key recruits. The
independent Stephen Hempstead and Thomas Rogers would
join Wilson's faction; and Deru\is Mahony and Joseph B. Dorr
founded the Dubuque Express and Herald "for the purpose . . . of
fighting Jones."'**
Jones's power in this contest is illustrated by the short-lived
career of Lincoln Clark, a New England lawyer who arrived in
Dubuque in 1847 by way of Alabama. Jones quickly took Clark
under his wing, choosing his "friend" as U.S. congressman from
the Dubuque district in 1850. At first Clark enjoyed the benefits
of his new status as a Jones insider: invitations to parties, levees,
strategy meetings, and political caucuses "behind the curtain
where great men relaxed." Jones also sent Clark a flood of re-
ports, books, and papers to educate him. Eventually, however,
Clark, a proud man, bristled at his dependency. When he pub-
licly opposed a railroad bill proposed by Jones, Jones cut Clark
off completely, withdrew his support, portrayed him as a sup-
porter of his opponent Thomas Wilson, and ended his career.
Clark returned home a year later, humiliated and mortified.
Placed under the "ban of oligarchy," he knew he was "finished"
politically.^
19. Parish, George Wallace Jones, 34, 180-82, 44-46; M. M. Hoffman, 'The WU-
sons of Dubuque," Anmls oflowa 21 (1935), 237.
20. Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark, 31 January, 10, 13, and 25 February, 5 ar\d 21
July 1852, 3 January, 28 February, and 17 March 1853, Lincoln Clark Papers;
Franc Wilkie, A Brief Sketch of the Life and Services and a Defence [sicj of the Public
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Richard Bonson had more success balancing an independ-
ent course and loyalty to Jones. Like Clark, Bonson got his start
in politics as a "Jones man" and made quick gains because of
Jones's initial influence. Jones set up a reluctant Bonson as state
legislator from Dubuque County in 1852. Less concemed than
Clark about the appearance of dependency, Bonson enjoyed be-
ing with other "Jones men" such as John G. Shields, Judge John
King, Ben Samuels, William J. Barney, George Nightingale, John
J. Dyer, George Williams, Judge William Lovell, Richard Mob-
ley, Charles Corkery, Thomas McKnight, and Patrick Quigley. '^
Thus Bonson, as a representative of Dubuque's immigrant
culture, interacted with the Main Street culture of the bench and
bar, led by George Wallace Jones; and both were conscious of
the dominant presence of the genteel culture headed by the
Langworthys. Through politics, as well as by forming associa-
tions, clubs, churches, and other institutions, the interests and
identities of the men involved in Dubuque's three distinct elite
subcultures intersected, allowing the town's pioneer entrepre-
neurs to establish and promote a common booster ethos.
AT FIRST, Dubuque's booster policy and state and national
politics were linked. The early booster elite more or less ran
Dubuque's city government in the 1840s and early 1850s. In ad-
dition to the Langworthys, that group included a small coterie
of boosters from the Main Street elite: Jesse R Farley, a pioneer
merchant and three-time mayor; Caleb H. Booth, Dubuque's
first mayor, who was also involved in lumber milling, mining,
and the land warrant business with William J. Barney; Peter A.
Lorimier, a miner, smelter, and merchant; Major Richard Mobley,
Dubuque's first and most prominent banker; plus a number of
Democratic lawyers and politicians, such as Warner Lewis,
George Nightingale, John Shields, and David S. Wilson." Early
boosters acted on the premise that city government was a "tool
Course of Hon. George Wallace Jones, United States Senator from the State of Iowa
(n.p. 1852), 31-32.
21. Richard Bonson, Diary, 1-25 Deœmber 1852,1,7, and 8 October 1853.
22. Childs, History ofDitbuque County, 786-87, 838, 850, 881; Andreas, Illustrated
Historical Atlas o/lowa, 366-68; Childs, Frontier River City. 74,81,91.
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to promote growth and commerce." The miners among Dubuque
boosters focused their attention in the 1840s on gaining control
of federally owned lead-mining lands and improving their dty's
harbor to enable Dubuque to compete with Galena as a shipper
of lead to St. Louis." Requiring legislation and financial support
from the federal government, both efforts brought Jones's influ-
ence to bear on local affairs and connected local efforts to the
formulation of national policy."
Jones's involvement in booster affairs intensified when
boosters across the N4idwest ran into strong opposition in Wash-
ington to the idea of the government undertaking or funding
internal improvements. Such opposition was typically voiced
by Democrats, at least until Jones and other western Democrats
called for a change in public policy. Although they failed to
convince the federal government to pursue harbor and river
improvements, the shift in focus to railroads in the late 1840s
renewed the debate.
But the emergence of the corporation as a new organiza-
tional framework to build railroads, a necessity given the vast
cost of the undertaking, reoriented the debate. Across the Mid-
west, private corporatior\s were chartered to undertake railroad
projects: the Galena and Chicago Uruon Railroad in 1846; the
Alton and Chicago Railroad in 1847; and the Northern Cross
Railroad in 1848. Jones himself called meetings in Dubuque to
encourage local boosters to buy stock in the Galena and Chi-
cago Union Railroad. Soon thereafter he organized his own
company, the Keokuk and Dubuque Railroad, to build a south-
north railroad. The organizational benefits of the corporation
were obvious: concentrated management in a board of direc-
tors, limited liability to directors and stockholders, and access to
23. Einhorn, Property Rules. 44; Childs, Frontier River City, 67.
24. Childs, Frontier River City, 69, 73; Mentor Williams, "The Background of the
Chicago River and Harbor Convention, 1847," Mid-America 30 (1948), 223;
Resolutions of the Legislature of Joma, Relative to the Completion of the Harbor at
Dubuque, January 25,1849, 30th Cong., 2d sess.. House Misc. Doc. 14; Portion of
town pian of both Dubuque and Dunleith, Illinois, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Senate
Ex. Doc, No. 1,1854; Jefferson Davis, Report of the Secretary of War, In compliance
with a Resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, the Report of W. R. Palmer, Re-
specting the Improvement of the Harbor of Dubuque, March 3,1857, 34th Cong., 3d
sess.. Senate Exec. Doc. 66,1857.
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vast private capital without any need to consult local or state
goverrunent. Yet corporations continued to have trouble secur-
ing enough working capital. They also encountered legal resis-
tance to private entities operating on such a broad scale. Such
issues brought the debate back to govemment.^ "^
The Illinois Central Railroad Bill, presented to Congress in
1850 by Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas, tumed the debate in a
new direction. Jones's involvement intensified, and the booster
ethos in Dubuque was transformed. The proposed federal gov-
ernment grant of public lands to a private corporation—in this
case the Illinois Central Railroad—^was defended on the grounds
that the grant, by enabling the company to build the railroad,
would serve the "public good." The act thus transformed cor-
porations into quasi-public entities. Passed in 1850, the bill es-
tablished a precedent that capitalists and entrepreneurs across the
West rushed to follow. As "railroad fever" swept across Illinois
and eastern Iowa, Jones ensured that Dubuque would catch the
"fever." At the last moment, he asked Senator Douglas to add an
amendment to the bill to extend construction to the Mississippi
River opposite Dubuque, thus making Dubuque rather than
Galena the terminus of the Illinois Central. Recogruzing that a
connection to the Mississippi River would strengthen the argu-
ment that the bill served a "national interest," Douglas agreed,
apparently without taking into consideration the response of
Galena boosters. Dubuque residents were immediately aware
of the implications as Jones's "stock . . . advance[d] one hundred
percent" and his "enemies ha[d] nothing left them."^^
Dubuque boosterism and national politics would coincide
from the passage of the Illinois Central Bill in 1850 to the pas-
sage of an Iowa Land Grant Bill in 1856. However, local support
for Jones's north-south Keokuk and Dubuque Railroad was un-
25. William B. Ogden to Charles S. Hempstead, 31 July, 1849, Charles S. Hemp-
stead Papers, Chicago Historical Society; Childs, Frontier River City, 77; Parish,
George Wallace ¡ones, 36-37, 41-42; Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of Amer-
ica: Culture and Society in tfie Gilded Age (New York, 1982), 4, 6-7; Mason Bray-
man Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
26. Parish, George Wallace Jones, 38; Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas
(New York, 1973), 310-12; Hobart C. Carr, Early History of Iowa Railroads (New
York, 1981), 39, 53-55; J. J. Norman to George Wallace Jones, 17 February 1850,
George Wallace Jones Papers.
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dermined by the Illinois Central Bill and by the founding of the
Chicago and Rock Island Railroad in Davenport in 1851, the
Burlington and Missouri River Railroad in 1851, and the Peoria
and Oquawka Railroad in Burlington in 1852. Some locals, such
as Lincoln Clark, argued that Ehibuque should build a road
rurming west from Dubuque. Jones suggested, however, that
Iowans supporting each of the competing railroads—including
his own, which ran perpendicular to (and thus literally at cross
purposes with) the other newly proposed railroads— j^oin forces
to advocate a variety of land grants crisscrossing the state in the
"national interest." In the spring of 1852, boosters from Burling-
ton, Davenport, Dubuque, and even Keokuk rushed to Wash-
ington, D.C., to lobby for the Iowa Land Grant Bill in Congress.
Because the contradictory plan reflected local jealousies rooted
in obvious local interests, they were unable to argue convinc-
ingly that the grant fulfilled a "national" interest. They also
faced strong opposition from supporters of Galena. Harsh criti-
cism from Thompson Campbell, Galena's U.S. congressman,
touched off an emotional debate that highlighted the local,
rather than national, interests behind the bill. As a result, the
Iowa railroad bill failed
THE FAILURE of the initial effort to acquire a land grant had
three immediate consequences: it finished Jor\es's Keokuk and
Dubuque Railroad; it focused Jones's and other Dubuque
boosters' attention on securing the promised connection to the
Illinois Central; and it convinced some Dubuque boosters that
they needed to organize their own railroad company and secure
from Congress a land grant extending to the west.^ ^ Dubuque
boosters pursued the first part of this new strategy by courting
Illinois Central officials with offers of land and capital to ensure
construction of the railroad to Dunleith, Illinois. They also in-
vited railroad officials to visit Dubuque.
27. Childs, Frontier River City, 77-78; Mahoney, ProzHnciat Lives, 236-39.
28. Lincoln Clark to JuUa Clark, 6 June 1852, Lincoln Clark Papers; Childs,
Frontier River City, 78; Thomas S. Nairn to George Wallace Jones, 9 January
1851, George Wallace Jones Papers.
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Meanwhile, Dubuque boosters worked to thwart renewed
efforts by Galena boosters to repeal Jones's amendment to the
Illinois Central Bill. Dubuque boosters observed with satisfac-
tion—and some trepidation—the Illinois Central's determina-
tion to crush Galena boosters' resistance to "the corporate be-
hemoth." Perhaps taken aback by this display of corporate
power over local interests such as their own, Dubuque boosters
proceeded to form their own railroad company'''
In April and early May 1853 Dubuque boosters called a series
of railroad meetings to organize a railroad company. George
Wallace Jones and his "old friend" Lucius Langworthy en-
thralled those in attendance with visions of Dubuque as the
eastern terminus of a road that stretched across Iowa and then
Nebraska Territory, through the South Pass of the Rockies to
San Francisco. In spite of a vigorous debate about the political
and economic feasibility of such a company, the Dubuque and
Pacific Railroad Company was chartered on May 16, 1853, un-
der Iowa's Articles of Incorporation. Jones, two outside investors,
and some of Dubuque's most committed boosters—Lucius
Langworthy, H. W. Sanford (land speculator), Jesse P. Farley
(then mayor of Dubuque), F. S. Jesup, Robert Waller (a friend of
Richard Bonson), and Platt Smith—^were appointed to the board.
Smith, a lawyer, was elected to organize and run the company.**
Dubuque boosters were determined to maintain loca! control
over the Dubuque and Pacific Company. This set them apart
from boosters in Davenport and Burlington. There, Chicagoans
and New Yorkers were granted majority control of the Chicago
and Rock Island Railroad, the Burlir\gton and Missouri River
Railroad, and, somewhat later, the Peoria and Oquawka. Per-
29. This story is told in the Mason Brayman Papers, general correspondence,
June 1852-August 1854, Chicago Historical Society. See also Charles Hemp-
stead Papers, Chicago Historical Society; Mahoney, Provincial Lives, 218-39;
and the following letters in New York Office, In-Letters, Illinois Central Collec-
tion, Newberry Library, Chicago: Henry S. Wiltse and William Y. Loveil to
Robert Schuyler, March 1851; H. W. Sanford to Robert Schuyler, 21 August
1851; Citizens of Galena, Petition to Change Terminus of the Road to Galena,
16 April 1852; Nicholas Dowling to Robert Schuyler, 5 June 1852; H. W. San-
ford to George Wallace Jones, 29 May 1852; and George Wallace Jones to Illi-
nois Central Railroad Board of Directors, June 1852.
30. Childs, Frontier River City, 111.
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haps Dubuque boosters' frustrations about government control
of mining lands or their awareness of the vagaries of the mar-
ketplace explains their commitment to maintaining ownership
and control over local economic development. Or perhaps the
scale of their efforts and doubts that the river would be bridged
at Dubuque protected them. In any case, they imagined Du-
buque as a mostly locally owned regional economic center run
by and for the benefit of all townspeople. Committed to defend-
ing this ideology of the "way of the town," a hallmark of what
would later be called the "old middle class," they bristled at the
thought of their town becoming just an outpost or stop along a
road controlled by outsiders. Hence, the efforts of the directors
of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, from its establishment in
1853 through its reorganization in 1864 and its subsequent de-
mise in the late 1870s, to maintain control became a symbolic
struggle of local resistance against national economic forces.^ '
The firm's local agenda, however, made it difficult for many
Dubuquers to view it as anything more than a particular self-
interested group of investors, as opposed to a coalition of indi-
viduals representing a broad public interest. Platt Smith would
quickly discover this when he launched a three-pronged strat-
egy to acquire capital from townspeople to build the first 30
miles of the line, putting the company in a position to be able to
fulfill the obligations of a federal land grant. First he passed the
hat among the directors and received promises for $500,000.
Then he "got up the stock subscriptions" among the people of
Dubuque and surrounding counties. Smith knew, however, that
stock subscriptions and promises to pay often took months to
generate cash, and neither would bring in enough to meet the
exorbitant cost of railroad construction. Therefore, he resusci-
tated an old idea once tried to support harbor improvements: he
asked the city and county governments for public funds. Smith
proposed that the city and county kick off the stock subscription
drive by buying $100,000 and $200,000 of railroad stock, respec-
tively, with public funds. Before others could question the
31. Wiebe, The Opening of American Society, 299; Platt Smith to C. B. Raymond,
25 January 1858, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, Dubuque Office,
Out-Letters, 1856-1861, Illinois Central Railroad Collection, Newberry Library;
Report of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company (Dubuque, 1858), 19.
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move. Smith asked the mayor (a railroad director) to formally
ask the county judge (a friend of the railroad) to call for an elec-
tion to vote on a public referendum on the question. He then
launched a campaign of public meetings with "great talk about
a railroad to the Pacific." Not surprisingly, voters approved the
proposal by a 5 to 1 ratio in town and 4 to 3 in the county. Con-
cluding that Dubuquers had decided that "we are [now] a rail-
road people," Smith rented an office on Main Street, printed up
letterhead, and got down to the work of being a "railroad man." ^
Although he was successful in gaining an electoral majority.
Smith's request for public funds unwittingly interjected the Du-
buque and Pacific's business strategy into a divisive political
debate on public policy that undermined boosters' efforts to
foster unity. This was particularly troublesome because, until a
land grant bill was almost assured. Smith was unable to use
evidence of construction progress to rally support behind the
railroad. Nor, Smith gradually realized, could he depend as
much as he had on George Wallace Jones to unify Dubuque
Democrats behind the railroad. It was apparent that Jones's po-
litical power had reached its apex. The fallout from the failed
effort to acquire a land grant in 1852, the perception that Jones
was serving his last term in the U.S. Senate, the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the rise of the Republican party (Iowa
elected a Republican govemor in 1854) weakened Jones's con-
trol over the party and invigorated a variety of factions. The ris-
ing power of other Democrats, Whigs, and Republicans inter-
jected a new dynamic into booster affairs. As the suppressed
political ambitions of others, including Richard Bonson and the
Langworthys, were given new life, their commitment to act for
the public good and support a booster policy weakened.
OPPOSITION to the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad's agenda
came quickly. A group of longtime opponents of George Wallace
Jones, led by David S. Wilson and James Burt, filed a lawsuit
32. Andreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas of Iowa, 367; Dubuque County v. Dubuque
and Pacific Railroad, 4 Greene 6; Richard Bonson, Diary, 19 May and 4 and 6
June 1853; Platt Smith to Jesse P. Farley, 23 August 1857, Dubuque and Pacific
Railroad, Illinois Central Collection.
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against the railroad in Dubuque district court. They charged
that state law prohibited the city and county, just like the state
government, from holding stock in private corporations. By
issuing bonds to buy railroad stock, ¿le city and county were
allowing a majority to illegally tax a minority.
Platt Smith successfully defended the railroad in both the
district and state supreme courts. He argued that since the con-
stitution permitted counties and cities to issue bonds for extra-
ordinarily costly bridge and road projects and, because railroads
were, by implication, "roads," such a use of public funds was
legal. By sanctioning the use of public funds to pursue boosters'
goals, Dubuque County v. Dubuque and Pacific Railroad tumed the
corporation into a quasi-public-policy-making entity. The ruling
trar\sformed the political economy in towns and cities across
Iowa and further west. The promise of public funding gave life
to a variety of companies and intertwined booster policy and
local politics.^
More opposition came from within the board of directors. In
a discussion about where to locate the depot and what route the
road should take west out of Dubuque, the north-south split
among mining interests quickly surfaced. On one side, Richard
Bonson, Richard Waller, J. Emerson, and probably H. W. Sanford
advocated that the depot be located downtown near lower Main
Street, with the line proceeding west via Couler valley and Cat-
fish Creek valley, where they owned land. On the other side,
Lucius Langworthy, Jesse P. Farley, and others argued for a de-
pot uptown, with tracks going west out through Langworthy
Hollow. Dennis A. Mahony, editor of the Dubuque Express and
Herald, rebuked the directors for "split[ting] up into selfish
cliques and coteries" and for acting for their own self-interest
without regard for the "interests of the people." But neither
Mahony's public criticism, the hastily organized railroad festi-
val to celebrate the arrival of the Illinois Central Railroad across
33. Dubuque County v. Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, 4 Greene 6; Michael A. Ross,
"Cases of Shattered Dreams: Justice Samuel Freeman Miller and the Rise and
Fall of a Mississippi River Town," Annals of Iowa 57 (1998), 213-15, 230-39;
Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Report, 1857; Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation
of America, 4.
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the river, nor the formation of a Board of Trade could mediate
the directors' differences.^
Shortly thereafter, Lucius Langworthy resigned fi-om the
Dubuque and Pacific board. Then, to force the railroad depot
matter, he formed a land company and petitioned the city coun-
cil to grant city land at Seventh Street to either the Dubuque and
Pacific Railroad Company or the Dubuque and Western Rail-
road Company, which he intended to establish. Responding to
a request from an ad hoc people's committee formed to agitate
the depot issue, the new Board of Trade tried to draw the sides
together by calling for « series of public meetings. The meetings,
however, backfired by only deepening the antipathy between
the two sides. Supporters of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
faction opposed Langworthy's petition on the grounds that
such a grant did not, like a railroad grant, provide public ad-
vantage, and thus would increase public debt solely for private
gain. The Langworthys, irked by the criticism, ignored further
mediation by the Board of Trade. On September 10, 1855, they
formalized their opposition to the EHibuque and Pacific Rail-
road by incorporating the Dubuque and Western Railroad
Company. Although local papers took the formation of another
railroad company as evidence that Dubuque was now a true
railroad city, the Dubuque and Pacific saw the Langworthys'
railroad as a threat and rushed to begin construction—with the
help of yet another loan from the city. ^
Meanwhile, as progress was made in pursuit of an Iowa
land grant bill, local land values began to rise. Boosters rushed
to buy land in the city around the proposed depot sites of the
two railroads, and then established land companies that paral-
leled the support for the two roads. In May 1855, James, Lucius,
and Solon Langworthy incorporated the Dubuque Harbor Im-
provement Company, or the Seventh Street Company. In re-
sponse, Richard Bonson, Jesse P. Farley, and several "friends"
associated with the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad began buying
34. Childs, Frontier River City, 118; Dubuque Express and Herald, 7 June and 6
and 10 July 1855.
35. Dubuque Express and Herald, 26 and 27 July, 7 August, and 3 and 10 Septem-
ber 1855; City Council Minutes, 18 August 1855, October 1855, Wahlert Memo-
rial Library, Loras College, Dubuque; Childs, Frontier River City, 135-38.
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land aroimd Jones Street in order to dredge the harbor, fill in
sloughs, extend streets, and make improvements. They became
informally known as the Jories Street Improvement Company.
In January 1856 they met to formally incorporate themselves as
the Dubuque Harbor Company. The directors included Charles
Grégoire, brother-in-law of George Wallace Jones, and two
members of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad board; other di-
rectors were stockholders of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad,
including both associates of the Jones faction and Yorkshire
friends of Richard Bonson. With even the cautious Bonson con-
vinced that "the Harbor Improvement will make a great deal of
money," the inside call for a subscription drew a rush of inves-
tors, including George Wallace Jones and many other "Jones
men." All of them watched in amazement as shares soared in
value in anticipation of the passage of the Iowa land grant bill
that would essentially capitalize the Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road and secure Dubuque's future. In between the two oppos-
ing companies, a third company, the Ehibuque Central Im-
provement Company, run by Robert Waples, Jesse Farley, and
Franklin V. Goodrich, each of whom had interest in the Lang-
worthys' company, began to operate informally in early 1856
and was incorporated in July 1857.^
Thus by early 1856, as land values appreciated, three sets of
booster comparues with competing but interlocking directorates
and stockholders stood poised to secure public lands and funds
from the city council, the state of Iowa, and the federal govern-
ment. They also sought public and private morues through
stock subscriptions in order to make public improvements that
would further appreciate the value of lands held privately by
their respective companies, as well as by individual directors of
each company. With the profits generated, the directors would
become rich, and through reinvested capital and prosperity.
36. Dubuque Express and Herald, 25 August 1855; City Council Minutes, 1 July
1855; Childs, Frontier River City, 158; History of Dubuque County, 532; Dubuque
County Incorporation Records, County Recorder's Office, Dubuque County
Courthouse, Dubuque; "Articles of IncorporaHon," 2 January 1856, and Min-
utes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 1 April, 1856, State His-
torical Society of Iowa, Iowa City; Richard Bonson, Diary, 1 January 1856;
Thomas S. Wilson to George Wallace Jones, 4 March 1856, George Wallace
Jones Papers.
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more railroads would be built and more improvements made.
Such a "liberal" "railroad policy," which "encourage[d] the con-
struction of roads in every possible direction," would secure for
Dubuque "a trade that will in time be as important and valuable
to us as was that of the whole North-West to St. Louis," making
the former "city of the mines," the great "market" of the region.^
THIS BOOSTER POLICY OR SCHEME was firmly rooted in
the premise that local boosters would pay for it and control it.
Its success hinged on two things. Boosters, organized in com-
panies intricately intertwined by conflicts of interest and per-
sonal connections, had to clarify the interaction among various
companies and the city government, gain popular support, and
muffle local opposition. But first they had to secure passage of
the Iowa Land Grant Bill. Without it the scheme was doomed.
Rising land prices were the yeast that would make the whole
structure expand and generate profits. Having learned from
their experience in 1852, as well as from attending several recent
regional railroad conventions, that they needed to speak the
language of "national interest" to convince out-of-state con-
gressmen to vote for a federal land grant, George Wallace Jones
and others made the final push for the passage of a federal land
grant for Iowa in the spring of 1856.
But by then the national and regional political climate had
changed. The completion of three railroads to the Mississippi,
combined with the beginning of construction west of the river,
had created a growing bipartisan, albeit sectional, consensus
among northern Democrats and Republicans in support of us-
ing public land grants to fund the building of a transcontinental
railroad. This broadened support for a land grant bill. That win-
ter in Washington, James Thorington of Davenport and George
Wallace Jones submitted to the House and Senate respectively
bills that would give the state of Iowa four grants of land to be
used to fund railroad construction stretching across Iowa. The
Burlington and Missouri Railroad, which citizens had subscribed
for only on April 7,1856, would begin in Burlington; the Missis-
37. Dubuque Express and Herald, 1 March 1856; George Nightingale to George
Wallace Jones, 15 May 1856, George Wallace Jones Papers.
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sippi and Missouri Railroad in Davenport; the Cedar Rapids
and Missouri Railroad in Lyons; and the Dubuque and Pacific
Railroad in Dubuque. Construction of all four lines was to pro-
ceed westward to points on the Missouri River. After much less
debate than in 1852, the bills passed the House and Senate. On
hearing the news in May 1856, Dubuque lawyer George Night-
ingale wrote to his friend George Wallace Jones, "we feel here in
Dubuque that your untiring vigilance in our interests has made
us what we are and what we expect to be." As a result of Jones's
efforts, he continued, "things look brighter for our beloved 'city
of the mines,' every day add[ing] to our importance, wealth,
and improvement. "^ '^
Six weeks later, the debate shifted from Washington to the
Iowa statehouse. Almost everyone expected the special session
of the Iowa legislature to accept the federal Iowa Land Grant
Bill. Govemor James Grimes, however, first wanted to clarify
which companies would receive the land grants and upon what
terms. Iowans and Dubuquers were divided on those issues.
Jones's power was still sufficient to er\sure that Dubuque and
Pacific supporters, such as Richard Bonson, dominated the
Dubuque delegation. In a last-ditch effort, however, the Lang-
worthys tried to disturb the unity of the delegation. A group
of Galenans also sought to disrupt the proceedings from the
gallery, but the Dubuque delegation quashed their effort.
Meanwhile, supporters back home staved off a rearguard
challenge by the Langworthys. After most Dubuque and Pacific
supporters had left for Iowa City, the Lang;worthys called a
public meeting "to discuss the railroad interests of Dubuque."
At the local meeting, Lucius H. Langworthy, director of the
Dubuque and Western Railroad, presented a resolution to run
the federally funded line from a depot on Fourth or Fifth Street
out through Langworthy Hollow. Major Mobley, speaking for
the Dubuque and Pacific, argued that citizens had already effec-
tively chosen the Dubuque and Pacific route. He expressed con-
fidence that the board would act in the "agricultural, manufac-
turing, and commercial and social interests of northern Iowa."
38. Parish, George Wallace ¡ones, 48-49; Charles Mason, Diary, 6 April 1856;
George Nightingale to George Wallace Jones, 15 May 1856, George Wallace
Jones Papers.
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The meeting voted to reject Langworthy's resolution, and the
bill in the state legislature passed after a brief debate, thus open-
ing the way for the Dubuque and Pacific to begin construction.^'
Most Dubuque residents rejoiced at the passage of the bill,
but the task of clarifying local arrangements and muffling local
dissent still remained. Concerned that the "public good" was
being sacrificed for private gain, local populists charged in the
Dubuque Herald and Express that the Dubuque Harbor Company
and other "piratical companies" "threatened to rule the city"
and destroy "existing interests" through "broken promises and
violated compacts." The company's directors demanded to
know who was responsible for this "base slander," but to no
avail. In mid-May, the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad responded
by increasing its board to 13 members and stipulating that one
of the new directors be a representative of the city and county.
Dennis Mahony, editor of the Dubuque Express and Herald, ex-
pressed outrage that the directors were trying to deprive the
city and coimty—^who owned a majority of the stock—of "all
voice and control in the management of the road." In response,
the city stipulated that any company that received a grant from
the city had to permit an agent of the dty to examine their books
regularly to determine if they were indeed using public funds
"solely for the purpose of construction."^"
The city government did still possess real power. It owned
tracts of "public land" along the river acquired from the federal
government a decade before. It could generate revenues from
property and sales taxes. And it could cali elections. Thus it
maintained the critical power to capitalize the railroad and har-
bor improvement companies by floating public bond issues,
contracting out work in return for grants of city-owned land to
the companies, as well as simply granting or selling land. The
city—as mediator, watchdog, and a source of capital—was the
linchpin of the booster system. The various improvement and
39. William Salter, The Life of James W. Grimes (New York, 1876), 80-82; Dubuque
Express and Herald, 1 and 11 July 1856.
40. Dubuque Express and Herald, 21 March and 24 May 1856; Richard Bonson,
Diary, 25 March 1856; Minutes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Com-
pany, 25 March 1856; Minutes, Dubuque City Council, 15 October 1855.
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railroad comparées issued bonds to support improvement and
construction projects and contracted with the city to improve
city lands near those held privately by the companies. In return,
the city would grant the land to the company outright, or the
companies would purchase the land for cash or company bonds
with a mortgage on company land as collateral. In addition^ of
course, the companies paid taxes on the land.
As city policy and the operations of private companies be-
came even more elaborately intertwined, everyone in town be-
came more interdependent. As more residents equated private
and public interest, more funds furmeled into the booster sys-
tem. In the expansionary environment of 1856, each element of
this booster system rapidly took on a heavy burden of debt: the
dty government to support the railroads; the railroads to build
(now made more urgent by the land grant stipulation that they
must complete 75 miles of track by December 1, 1859, and 30
miles each year after that for five years); and the land companies
to buy land and make improvements. As long as land values
rose, dty revenues would benefit from increased taxes, continued
land sales would generate revenues to help build the railroad,
and higher profits would help retire private indebtedness while
encouraging all involved to accrue new debt to deepen their
investments to meet the ever-expanding needs of a growing
metropolis. Interwoven by overlapping directorates with nu-
merous conflicts of interest, this booster system of railroads,
improvement companies, and goveniment attracted capital that
stoked an upward spiral of speculation and appreciating land
values. Boosters in Dubuque rightly believed that the entire fu-
ture history of the city was at stake.**^
All through the summer and fall of 1856, in the midst of the
boom, anything seemed possible. Driven by ever-rising land
prices, investors went into debt to local banks to buy land and
stocks and bonds that would be sold again for a quick profit.
Instead of using profits to retire debt, investors took on ever
more debt to buy more land and stocks. Many individuals, the
Langworthys included, purchased or built new houses. Other
41. Exhibits and Documents Relating to the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company
(New York, 1857), Appendix D; Mahoney; Provincial Lives, 245.
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capitalists floated debts to build new banks, hotels, and busi-
ness blocks. In downtown Dubuque, 163 buildings were fin-
ished or under construction in 1856. The core of the city was
essentially rebuilt. Major Mobley built a new two-story bank
building on Main Street. Robert Waples "bought up all the land
and house[s] he could—pay[ing] but very little cash down."
Businessmen expanded their operations. Even the cautious
Richard Bonson borrowed heavily from Major Mobley to stimu-
late his mining business and at year's end "was ten thousand
better off than I was one year ago." The Dubuque and Pacific
Railroad went into debt to hire úie lawyers and engineers who
would determine the road's route through the county. Then the
railroad hired contractors, builders, and common laborers. Fi-
nally, there were supplies: the iron and wood needed to build
the road. Along the proposed route, the various improvement
companies would fill in and improve lots. With all this activity,
Dubuque rode atop a remarkable boom in 1856, and its popula-
tion soared to more than 15,000. An excited Lincoln Clark, for-
mer congressman and now a "railroad man," wrote to his
daughter, promising to keep her "iriformed of the rise and pro-
gress of our western Gotham!""
THE BOOM did not last, however. No sooner had most Du-
buque businessmen gone into debt to foster economic develop-
ment than financial rumblings in the East shook the foundations
of Dubuque's booster system. Early in 1857 the price of railroad
stocks leveled off and ihen began to drop. Eastern barücs tight-
ened credit, cut off new loans to the West, called in debts, and
began to limit the western currency they would accept in pay-
ment for obligatior\s. By mid-spring, the credit squeeze had be-
gun to draw specie from the West to the East, leaving western
economies with only rapidly depreciating currency. Inflation
soared, money supplies shrank, and land and stock prices
plunruneted. Land sales stopped. Companies and individual
42. Childs, Frontier River City, 149-50, 155; History of Dubuque County, 530;
Conzett, "My Recollections of Dubuque," 249, 261; Richard Bonson, Diary, 1
January 1857; Lincoln Clark to Catherine Clark, 29 December 1856, Lincoln
Clark Papers.
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investors alike found themselves with unmarketable depreci-
ated assets, no revenue, and heavy debts."
By late spring 1857, the pressure in the East threatened to
bring down ¿le entire edifice of the booster system—the railroad
and improvement companies as well as the banks, businessmen,
and local government è\at supported them. As local bankers felt
pressure to meet obligations back east, they called in loans from
individuals who were forced to pursue those who owed them or
liquidate depreciated assets, if they could, in order to pay. Thou-
sands of individuals and businesses faced bankruptcy. They de-
layed liquidation by promising to pay from their remaining assets
—even as interest on outstanding debts and taxes due on land or
housing continued to bury them deeper in debt. As taxes went
unpaid, soon even the city government was starved of revenue
and unable to pay its employees. The relative simplicity of the
chain of debt that tied Dubuquers to each other and to national
capital markets thus enabled Ü\e pressure to strike with alarming
speed at the pillars of the local booster system—the Dubuque
and Pacific Railroad and the Dubuque Harbor Company. Again
the future of the city was at stake. This time, however, the option
was not whether or not Dubuque would become the emporium
of the northwest, but whether it would survive at all.
By early July 1857, Platt Smith recognized that the Dubuque
and Pacific Railroad Company urgently needed an infusion of
funds to allow it to continue to meet its obligations and avoid
default. Earlier he and the local directors had allowed two New
York investors on the board as trustees. Their purpose was to sell
Dubuque and Pacific bonds in the New York and European capi-
tal markets. News of poor bond sales in New York and Europe
left Smith with only two options. He could go back to the New
York trustees for help and risk losing local control of the com-
pany, or he could go back to the beleaguered local directors. He
decided to go to New York. During his desperate and frustrating
two-month-long trip, the financial pressure turned into panic
with the collapse of the Ohio Life and Trust Company. SmiÜi de-
spaired about saving the railroad company's credit. The trustees.
43. History of Dubuque County, 531; Dubuque Express and Herald, 27 May 1857;
Robert Benson to Abraham Hewitt, 5 and 10 July, and Platt Smith to ]. H Colton,
March 1858, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, Dubuque Office, In-Letters.
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strapped themselves, were indifferent, inaccessible, and unwill-
ing to lend a hand. To Smith, their blasé attitude about the com-
pany's impending failure indicated a willingness to let it fail so
they could pick up what was left of the company and run it
themselves. Infuriated and deeply aware of how his own, the
company's, and Dubuque's self-interest were now intertwined,
Smitii pondered the consequences of such a course for Dubuque:
What is to be done? . . . Our road can be sold on execution if we do
not meet our liabilities In the meantime property and business
in Dubuque will drop and languish—our fine new hotel will remain
vacant—improvement companies must stop—the sales they have
made will fall through, one line of daily boats will do the business
done by two.. . . the property of tXibuque which is now assessed at
ten millions will not be worth five. Businessmen will fail. . . . the
railroad wUl. . . fail.. . in a few days unless relief comes immedi-
ately. Dubuque will be set back ten years and will probably never
recover.**
The only solution Smith saw was for the Dubuque directors
to save the company and Dubuque by averting, delaying, or
putting off liquidation. There were only two ways to do this: go
into their own pockets to come up with more working capital,
or find a way to liquefy their remaining assets that would allow
them to stay in business by temporarily satisfying creditors.
Smith desperately called on the "manly vital interests" of Du-
buque's boosters to save the "enterprise" from being "ruined."
Privately he told J. P. Farley that not to "come to the rescue"
would be the "most foolhardy and unmitigated piece of stupid-
ity and want of foresight that was ever heard of." He warned
that if the directors did not, he would wash his hands of the
whole matter, and "hope in that event the place will sir\k" as he
believed it certainly would/^
In September Caleb Booth and Platt Smith undertook a two-
pronged strategy. First they approached the directors, as well as
local banks and the Dubuque Harbor Company, for more contri-
44. Robert Benson to Abraham Hewitt, 5 and 10 July 1857, and Platt Smith to ].
P. Farley, 24 and 25 July and 1 and 31 August 1857, Dubuque and Padfic Rail-
road Company, In-Letters; Minutes, Dubuque City Council, 15 June 1857.
45. Platt Smith to J. P Parley, 21 and 31 August 1857, Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road Company, In-Letters.
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butions for a subscription of stock. Since H. L. Stout and Dickey
Waller, members of the board of the Harbor Company, and Rich-
ard Bonson, a major stockholder, were, like others, also stock-
holders in the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad and had railroad
bonds among their assets, the Harbor Company felt compelled
to agree. Smith raised more capital by using the company's only
assets—stock, bonds, and land—as collateral to issue more
bonds. Aware how impossible the "money famine" made it for
anyone to buy goods and services or pay creditors. Smith de-
cided to issue Dubuque and Pacific Company certificates—in
effect, IOUs—to pay workers, contractors, and creditors. He
hoped the certificates would circulate as currency with no pres-
sure of redemption on the company But no sooner had he un-
dertaken these first steps than another wave of pressure hit.
When people stopped accepting company certificates, and as
promises to buy stock and bonds went unfulfilled, the company
found itself back where it started. Richard Bonson remarked
that he had "never new [sic] so tight times for money." Facing
increasing public pressure. Smith had no choice but to go to the
banks—not to ask for loans, but to try to mortgage what he
could from railroad and even his personal property to stay
afloat." When even the bai\ks hesitated. Smith played the only
card he had left.
Most Dubuquers considered the Dubuque Harbor Company
—on the basis of its land holdings, capital improvements, capital
assets contributed by its directors, stocks and bonds, and mini-
mal debt—to be "very wealthy"; sounder, in fact, than most
banks in town. Indeed, several weaker bai\ks had already failed,
and Major Mobley's bar\k tottered on the brink of failure. The
Langworthys, cautious as ever, protected themselves by limiting
the currency they would accept, curtailing any further loans, and
renegotiating their limited obligations in New York. Their actions
tightened the vise on the local economy. With nowhere else to
46. Minutes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 5 September
1857; Richard Bonson, Diary, 5 September, 9 October, and 23 November 1857;
Platt Smith to Jesse Farley, 27 and 29 September and 26 October 1857, Du-
buque and Pacific Railroad Company, In-Letters; "Source Material of Iowa
History: Mahony-Smith Letters on the Dubuque & Pacific Railnaad, 1857,"
Iowa Journal of History 54 (1956), 335-60.
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turn. Smith approached the Harbor Company on October 19
to ask for a major loan, offering a mortgage on railroad lands as
collateral. He intended to use the loan to issue more bonds and
a railroad currency to enable the company to continue operating.
Reacting to Smith's proposal, Richard Bonson and some mem-
bers of the board expressed concerris that currency issued by the
railroad would not be able to sustain its value. They feared that
the loan would never be repaid and that the failure of the rail-
road could drag down the Harbor Company with it. As a pre-
caution, they asked permission to check tine railroad's books.
Liquidity remained the core of the local economy's pre-
dicament. More and more local businesses tried to survive by
giving IOUs. The local newspapers did so for a while but found
that few people would accept them except for a ring of close
associates and friends in the booster system, among whom the
IOUs circulated like a transferable personal note or bill of ex-
change. Devoid of cash like everyone else, the city issued IOUs
as a kind of city scrip that they paid to workers and creditors,
hoping the scrip would circulate until the city could redeem
them with cash. But cash-strapped city workers started selling
the city scrip at a discount and then petitioned the city to make
up the difference, causing the scrip to fall in value to only about
fifty cents on the dollar. When the city's efforts to sustain the
scrip's value—either by furuieling it through city banks or by
issuing treasury notes on the city's good name—came to noth-
ing, it was clear that the city, like most local banks, lacked the
people's confidence to sustain the value of its scrip. Even so, the
city continued to issue "city scrip" in payment to city workers
for another year."
47. Platt Smith to John Duncombe, 26 October 1857, Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road Company, In-Letters; Iowa Credit Report Ledger 31, R. G. Dun and Com-
pany Collection; Minutes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 5
September and 19 and 22 October 1857; Richard Bonson, Diary, 5 September, 9,
12,14,15,16,19,21, 23, 24, and 31 October, and 23 November 1857.
48. See the following Petitions to City Council in Proceedings, Dubuque City
Council, Wahlert Library, Loras College: H. A. Jordan, 4 August 1857; Street
Commissioner's Men, 10 August 1857; John Hurley, 16 October 1857; and
Berry and Plater, October 1857. See also Minutes, Dubuque City Council, 29
September, 26 October, and 19 November 1857.
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Orüy scrip issued by a sound company that people trusted
would maintain its value and relieve some of Üie liquidation
pressure. Local bankers knew that, except for the Langworthys,
none of them had sufficient collateral to issue currency to re-
lieve the local "money famine." Recognizing this, "near all the
bankers" of Dubuque (except the Langworthys, who refused to
issue bank notes) approached the Dubuque Harbor Company
on October 14,1857, to ask it to issue paper money. In a series of
tumultuous meetings, the members of the board—including
Richard Bonson, who opposed the idea—debated how to re-
spond to the "application of bankers and resolutions of a meet-
ing of citizens and business men asking of this company the
issue of their post notes to relieve the wants of our business."
Aware of the risks but also aware that without some currency to
meet obligations they too would be foreclosed upon, the des-
perate directors passed a resolution agreeing that they would
"issue notes in sums of 1 to 10 dollars payable one year from
date at office of company and that they will loan their credit on
securities to their satisfaction . . . from $1 to $500,000 as in their
judgement they may be justified and at a rate of interest not ex-
ceeding ten percent per annum to be paid in advance." The Du-
buque Harbor Company—with no loans from the East or reli-
ance on bond sales, but with assets of cash on hand, land, and
stocks and bonds—had decided "to go into banking."'*''
Thus, the Dubuque Harbor Company, founded ostensibly to
benefit from the appreciation in land values generated by the
building of the railroad, and thus supported entirely by local
capital and land and immune to outside liquidation pressure,
now stood as the financial lender of last resort to save the Du-
buque and Pacific Railroad and the entire beleaguered booster
system. Constructed to promote the economic development of
Dubuque, the booster system now struggled to save the city's
economy. Most Dubuquers—even the Dubuque Express and Her-
ald, which opposed banking on principle "in all its forms"—
supported issuing currency because it seemed the only way to
"save the business community from ruin and thousands of
49. Minutes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 5 September and
19 and 22 October 1857; Richard Bonson, Diary, 5 September, 9, 12, 14, 15 16
17,19,21,23, 24, and 31 October, and 23 November 1857.
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people from starvation." When the Harbor Company notes
were printed and signed by the officers on November 12, the
company was besieged by requests for loans in currency. Even
Richard Bonson "took one of them today" as payment and then
used another to buy something, though he observed that it was
the first paper currency he had used in 15 years and feared
what the result would be.™
Rather than placing the notes into general circulation, the
company decided to fminel the notes, as loans, through the
hands of many of Dubuque's prominent boosters. The Harbor
Company quickly loaned the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
Company $50,000, although Bonson feared that they would
regret it. Even though Bonson complained that the company,
"influenced" by personal feelings and conflicts of interest, was
granting loans without proper security or collateral, the direc-
tors took care of many of their friends. Taking mortgages or
stocks in the Harbor Company or Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
Company as security, they loaned $12,000 to William G. Stewart
(a close friend of Bonson's); $10,000 to Major Mobley (whose
bank was near collapse); $10,000 to Caleb H. Booth and William
J. Barney; $5,000 (later increased to $7,000) to George Wallace
Jones; $2,500 to James Huff; $1,000 to Dennis Mahony (which
allowed him to continue publishing); and $500 to J. D. Bush.
Bonson, even after all his objections, took $6,000. Within days
the company's directors had loaned $46,000 on top of the $50,000
loaned to the Dubuque and Pacific, for a total of $96,000. In pro-
viding loans to its directors and their friends with collateral in
either the Harbor Company or the Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road Company, the directors allowed their friends to pay some
of their debts in order to save themselves. On November 21, the
company then put thousands more notes into general circulation.
A few days later, on Bonson's motion, the Dubuque Harbor
Company decided to limit its loans to $150,000.^ '
50. Dubuque Express and Herald, 28 October 1857; Richard Bonson, Diary, 20
October and 12 and 13 November 1857.
51. Richard Bonson, Diary 4,13,16,18,20,24, and 27 November 1857; Minutes,
Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23, and 27
November and 1 December 1857.
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The economic vise tightening around the city was paralleled
by the collapse of George Wallace Jones's political power. His
need for relief and his use of his house as collateral signaled his
declining power. Jones faced a growing coalition of opponents.
Anti-Nebraska factions led by Ben Samuels and Lincoln Clark
took the rise of the Republican Party in Iowa as a call to break
ranks from the Jones regime and join Thomas Wilson's men. In
the midst of the economic panic, the Wilson faction's campaign
against Jones intensified. Relations between the two increasingly
bitter opponents reached a low point when, during a heated
discussion "on the street" in Dubuque, Judge Wilson lost his
temper and "struck at General Jones with his kaine [sic] and
broke it." Although this local version of Preston Brooks's "can-
ing" of Charles Sumner in Congress harmed Wilson's chances,
independent Lincoln Clark, Bonson's close friend William Stew-
art, and Jones's longtime opponent Dennis A. Mahony were
nominated and ran for the state legislature. A few months later,
the state legislature elected James Grimes, a Republican, instead
of Jones, as Iowa's U.S. Senator. With Jones out of the way, nu-
merous Democrats "bolted" and formed new factions. Richard
Bonson, feeling the loss of Jones's support, decided to try to go
it on his own. Drawing some support from a remnant of the
Jones faction, he and William Stewart placed forward an "inde-
pendent" slate of candidates. Charging that this so-called in-
dependent slate acted in the interests of the Dubuque Harbor
Company and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, not
of the people, J. B. Dorr and Dermis Mahony led an emerging
courthouse clique to oppose them.^ ^
Meanwhile, as people began to use the Harbor money to
pay bills, meet obligations, and purchase goods, they got some
relief from the pressures they were under. On December 3,
Richard Bonson thought he might be able to "collect my debts
with it," and thus avoid foreclosing on friends and associates.
The following day, while the railroad started paying creditors
with Harbor notes, Bonson started paying for lead with them.
52. Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark, 2 January 1856 and 10 February 1857, Lincoln
Clark Papers; Richard Bonson, Diary, 19 and 26 August and 12, 13, 14, 15, and
21 September 1857, 23 and 27 September and 3 and 11 October 1859; Dubuque
Express and Herald, 13,22,23, and 29 September 1859.
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Lincoln Clark accepted and began using them to meet some of
his obligations. Denms Mahony was able to continue publishing
his newspaper. William J. Barney and Company, pressed to the
wall, "very short in everything" and not "able in some cases to
pay deposits in currency similar to that deposited," were able to
meet their obligations and protect their assets by paying out
"Dubuque Harbor money.""^ ^ Thus they survived.
But even as the Harbor Company currency seemed to create
some breathing room, the intense pressure on the company to
issue still more indicated how many Dubuquers had reached
desperate straits and were yet to be helped by the circulation.
Other companies, sensing the pressure, recognized the potential
returns on issuing notes. After all, since notes usually depreci-
ated, a note issued for one dollar and bought back several
months later at 75 cents represented a 25 percent return for the
company. Following the lead of the Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road, the Dubuque and Westem Railroad issued "construction
bonds" to pay workers and creditors. In December they began
issuing notes, signed by Lucius Langworthy, and continued to
do so through March 1858. In November the Harbor Improve-
ment Company, also funded by the Langworthys, began issuing
notes. The Dubuque Central Improvement Company issued its
own notes in January 1858. Meanwhile, city scrip still circulated.
Within several weeks, therefore, a local economy that had been
starved for cash in October had a city scrip and five circulating
currencies backed by local companies. Although such confusion
did not prevent locals from trading and satisfying many obliga-
tions, they could not use any local currency to meet regional or
national obligations. Outside pressure, therefore, still threatened
the entire economy.
These regional pressures were highlighted on December 5,
1857, when Dubuque residents awoke to the shocking news that
Major Mobley's bank had closed its doors. Mobley's failure sent
53. Richard Bonson, Diary, 3 and 4 December 1857; Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark,
28 January and 1 and 18 February 1858, Lincoln Clark Papers; Iowa Credit Re-
port Ledger 31, R. G. Dun and Company Collection.
54. Richard Bonson, Diary, 2 December 1857; Dubuque Express and Herald, 4 and
18 November 1857; Minutes, Dubuque City Council, 26 October and 19 No-
vember 1857 and 1 February 1858.
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ffee PiïMjc of 1857, the Dubuque Central Imprauement Company,
the Dubuque Harbor Company, and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad
Co. all issued currency such as these notes in a desperate attempt to keep
the Dubuque economy afloat. From Dean G. Oakes, Iowa Obsolete
Notes and Scrip (N.p.: Society of Paper Money Collectors, Inc., 1982).
shock waves through the beleaguered town. Richard Bonson,
hearing the news, remarked that "everyone feels bad about it."
Some company members were so afraid that they "feel like
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holding on a while about putting out any more notes." Jane
Taylor, writing to her son John at the Nashville Military Acad-
emy, considered the news noteworthy enough to report.
Major Mobley has struggled along with his business difficulties
until yesterday when he closed his doors. Everybody feels a great
deal of sympathy for him as he is a man very much respected for
his kind heart and integrity of character. There have been several
more assignments during the past week, among which Stanton and
Morgan and Quigley and brothers. Your father thinks they will get
through by the utmost economy and vigilance, but, of course, they
are making nothing, only buying to sell something from what has
already been accumulated and save a business reputation.
As more and more businesses failed and individuals were
forced into barücruptcy and liquidation, hundreds more drifted
toward ruin. Continuing pressures from outside creditors com-
pelled local creditors to lean more heavily on local debtors. Feel-
ing intense pressure, local citizens called a public meeting to im-
plore the Harbor Company to "provide for the redemption of
our post-notes at Chicago and St. Louis." H. L. Stout responded
that they could not. The Dubuque Express and Herald urged
townspeople to accept the harbor money at par to "establish a
confidence in the country" and argued that if "eastern creditors"
would "take produce in payment of their debts, the demand for
eastern exchange will abate, and the commercial community
will be relieved." By year's end, even as, in Bonson's estimation,
the "Harbor money [was] begirming to pass some better," scores
of businesses had failed and hundreds of individuals found
themselves completely ruined, forced to the wall, or encum-
bered by obligations they could not meet. One ruined bank
president, perhaps Major Mobley, caught the sense of shame
and humiliation that swept through Dubuque by commenting,
in regards to the 1857 season, that "the bottom fell out, and
every one was left financially without even a fig-leaf." *
55. Richard Bonson, Diary, 5 December 1857; Jane Taylor to John Taylor, 7 De-
cember 1857, John W. Taylor Collection; Conzett, "My Recollections of Du-
buque," 248.
56. Richard Bonson, Diary, 14 and 31 December 1857; Minutes, Board of Direc-
tors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 14 December 1857; Dubuque Express and Her-
ald, 16 December 1857; History of Dubuque County, 531-32.
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AT THE BEGINNING OF 1858, as "money matters" seemed to
be "coming to a crisis," nearly everyone in town, save perhaps
for the Langworthys and Richard Bonson, found themselves in
predicaments similar to those felt by Lincoln Clark, as an indi-
vidual, and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, as a
corporation. In January Clark saw his problem clearly: "I have a
great deal of property and but little money [and] this troubles
me." He could not raise money because he could not sell his
property for any amount at all. With no cash of any kind, he
was unable to pay his mortgage, the interest on his loans, or
taxes on his land. Clark later recognized that his "difficulties
were created almost wholly in the winter and spring of 1857 just
before the dreadful crash burst upon us" when he bought a new
house and land "mostly upon payments to be made in the fu-
ture." This "created all my embarrassments." So, too, the Du-
buque and Pacific Railroad was in an "embarrassed condition"
for much the same reasons. Because its property was "shingled
over with mortgages" and its revenues only paid expenses, it,
like everyone else, was stymied by rising taxes and interest that
threatened to consume what depreciated assets it had. Even
though many individuals and companies in Dubuque managed
to escape bankruptcy, most remained encumbered and spent
most of 1858, 1859, and even 1860 trying to satisfy, fend off,
avoid, or make arrangements with their creditors, or playing
one creditor against another, to remain solvent."
By early 1858, however, with several different bank notes in
circulation, the game of "swapping cats" or "swapping oats"
became harder to sustain. As more people became reluctant to
accept any more notes, their value declined. The Dubuque and
Pacific Railroad, for example, had used Harbor Company notes
to redeem construction notes, issue more construction bonds,
and pay off some debts, thus easing both redemption and liqui-
dation pressure against them. In addition, they paid creditors
who refused to take Dubuque and Pacific construction bonds
with Harbor notes. When, after February, some chose not to ac-
57. Lincoln Clark to Julia Clark, 9 and 28, January, 1, 8,15,18, and 25 February,
3 and 7 March 1858, and 6 March 1860, Lincoln Clark Papers; Platt Smith to
Robert Benson, 22 February 1858, and Platt Smith to F. F. Bishop, 12 March
1858, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, Out-Letters.
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cept even those, the company began paying creditors in bonds
or land deeds. By May 1858, the company, having used most of
its notes, and sensing local reluctance to accept any more harbor
notes, increasingly used its various Dubuque Harbor notes to
settle mostly out-of-town debts in the hinterland.'"
As the value of the currency began to slip in January and
February, and both local and outside creditors stopped accept-
ing it, it was apparent that the "swapping cats" scheme had run
its course. In mid-February the Harbor Company began reining
in its circulation by buying its own notes with cash, stocks, or
securities. Through the late winter and spring directors bought
up notes, sometimes with borrowed money, at 70 cents on the
dollar, and then bumed them. Richard Bonson made his last
transaction with the notes—a loan to Thomas Levens, an old
friend and fellow miner—on June 3, 1858. Although the notes
were gradually pulled out of circulation and fell out of use as
other currencies began to trickle back into Dubuque, as late as
December 4,1858, Bonson noted that the company believed that
as much as $21,000 was still in circulation. Stripped of the tem-
porary cushion of local solvency that the notes provided, Du-
buque now stood exposed to one final wrenching cycle of liqui-
dation. That one would push most residents to the wall and
compel both the Dubuque Harbor Company and the Dubuque
and Pacific Railroad to engage in one last effort to save them-
selves, as well as the city of Dubuque, from insolvency, default,
and '^
BY MARCH 1858, the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad was again
desperate, unable to meet any of its obligations. Fearing the
worst yet again, the directors sent Caleb Booth to New York to
58. Dubuque Express and Herald, 16 December 1857; Milo Quaife, ed.. The Early
Day of Rock Island and Davenport: Tlie Narratives of}. W. Spencer and /. M. D. Bur-
rows (Chicago, 1942), 253; Octave Thanet [Alice French], Olto the Knight and
other Trans-Mississippi Stories (Boston, 1891), 105; Platt Smith to E. F. Bishop, 12
March 1858, J. M. McKinley to Messrs. Wixxl, Light, and Company, 15 July
1858, J. M. McKinley to Matthew Bumell, 11 May 1858, and James McKinley to
W. J. Ackley, 1 June 1858, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, Out-Letters.
59. Richard Bonson, Diary, 27 January, 4, 6, and 13 February, 17,19, 20, 22, and
24 April, 3 and 17 June, and 4 December 1858.
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try to free some assets from the trustees in New York, but to no
avail. They also asked the state of Iowa to bail them out, but for
political reasor\s were refused. When the Langworthys refused
to help them, Platt Smith vented his frustration:
Several persons concemed in the Dubuque Westem Railroad are
very shallow, egotistical windy characters who parade their full
power before the public in a very disgusting manner. To have them
talk, one would suppose that Dubuque was the only place on earth,
and that they consfituted Dubuque; at any rate, if there was any-
thing more than what is comprehended in CXibuque it would be
merely an outside belt inhabited by outside barbarians who owed
tribute to and derived their light and knowledge from this great
center. I am sorry to say that a great many very sensible persons
with whom they have here to fore had intimate relatíons, residing
40 or 50 miles from this place, are much disgusted with the very
injudicious course which has been pursued by some of our narrow-
minded and egotistical citizens.*
By summer's end the tXibuque and Pacific and other debtors
pleaded with creditors not to pursue a "legal suit" that would
only "prevent us from raising money to disembarrass ourselves."
In late July, Jesse Farley went to New York yet again to try to
sort out some way of satisfying creditors.*'
At that point Richard Bonson, a stockholder in the railroad
as well as a director of the Dubuque Harbor Company with in-
terest in saving the railroad to maintain the assets of the Harbor
Company, allowed himself to be elected a director of the Du-
buque and Pacific Railroad. What he found shocked him. The
company was being strangled by a tightening noose of rising
costs and overdue interest and taxes in the face of declirung rev-
enues, depreciating land values, devaluing construction bonds,
sparse stock sales, and no subscriptions. By year's end, it was
apparent that the company would be unable to pay the Harbor
Company debt, impairing that company's ability to meet its
obligations. As Bonson had feared, and as director on both com-
60. Platt Smith to John E. Goodman, 10 May 1858, Dubuque and Pacific Rail-
road, Out-Letters.
61. Platt Smith to Messrs. Cook Bros., 19 July 1858, and Platt Smith to M. K.
Jesup, 25 July 1858, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, Out-Letters; Richard Bon-
son, Diary, 26 July 1858.
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pany boards he could now easily see, the insolvency of the rail-
road was dragging down the Harbor Company, and the two to-
gether would threaten the total collapse of Dubuque's economy."
Hard businessman that he was, Bonson concluded that only
a change in management would save the road. Solon Langwor-
thy agreed. The "railroad interests" of Dubuque were "entirely
stopped," he observed, and "a change in the officers of the road"
was the only "means of restoring the credit of the road." So too
the New York trustees argued that because the "road does not
pay/' it was "desirable to have a better and honester President
and Directors in their stead." True to their word, in spring 1859
they forced out the current directors, fired the contractors, in-
stalled men they trusted more, and began selling lands to ac-
cumulate capital. By that fall, the local directors, all feeling "tol-
erable flat about railroad matters," "hope[d] for the best" but
saw little point in meeting as they waited powerless for the final
drama to play out. It ended in May 1860 when New York trus-
tee Herman Gelpcke came to Dubuque, took over the railroad,
and relieved local directors of their management roles. On Au-
gust 7, 1860, the local directors "agreed to tum over the roade
[sic] to the trustees" without a fight. Richard Bonson remarked,
"it may be a bitter pill but it is the best we could posibily [sic]
have done—think it will answer." The local directors, now es-
sentially irrelevant, did not meet again until February 1861, at
which time they considered electing Bonson a director again,
but he saw no point in it and declined."
Gelpcke, as president of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad,
also purchased the Dubuque and Western Railroad, foreclosed
on its debt to the Dubuque and Pacific, and then foreclosed on
its creditors "in such a manner as to cut off all the other bond-
holders and stock holders." By year's end, the Langworthys
sued Gelpcke for some share of the proceeds, and a compromise
62. Richard Bonson, Diary, 7, 25, and 28 June 1858 and 26 January 1859; Min-
utes, Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 4 December 1858.
63. Solon Langworthy, Diary, 16 April 1859,1 and 21 November and 1 Decem-
ber 1860; Richard Bonson, Diary, 7, 25, and 28 June 1858, 26 January, 3, 4, 6, 8,
11, 14, 15, and 17 June, 14 and 27 October, and 22 and 29 November 1859,11
and 25 January, 11 February, 28, 29, and 31 May, 5 June, and 7 August 1860, 4
and 11 February 1861.
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was apparently reached. With the outbreak of Civil War two
months later, railroad construction stopped for four years, and
management quietly closed out both the Dubuque and Western
and the Dubuque and Pacific Railroads, reorganizing the latter
as the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad. Its land grant re-
mained intact, and Platt Smith and Caleb Booth were retained
to operate the railroad.*^
The experience of the Dubuque Harbor Company ended
with much the same result in mid-1859. Badly hampered by its
outstanding loan to the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, the lo-
cally owned company tried several ways to get some of its in-
vestment back. Unwilling to accept any assets of the railroad
company and unable to acquire enough from the directors
through an assessment, the Dubuque Harbor Company could
not pay its bills or redeem its last outstanding currency, leaving
everyone at year's end "down upon the railroad company
about the debt due them." The directors had few choices left.
They cut costs, suspended salaries, stopped improvement proj-
ects, and redeemed what notes they could. Bonson was "out of
all respect" for the directors, believing they were all "poor busi-
nessmen." He reported simply that "the harbor is in debt and
cannot pay." As interest payments and overdue taxes rose, the
company finally decided to cash out. In 1859 it sold its collateral
of railroad bonds at lower and lower prices, until by early sum-
mer 1860 it had paid all of its debts. Richard Bonson and H. L.
Stout were appointed agents simply to settle and collect debts.
When that was done, they did no business that year or the next.
After that, the directors met briefly twice a year; the minute
book reports simply that "there being no other business," they
adjourned. So as early as 1861, the Harbor Company, though
still a legal corporation, was "quiescent so far as public affairs
are concerned." It engaged primarily in managing its books
"preparatory to final exit from before the public gaze," which
did not finally take place until February 1,1882.^
64. Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, Out-Letters, 1864-1867.
65. Richard Bonson, Diary, 18 December 1858,14 and 22 January, 3 June, and 7,
10, 17, and 21 December 1859, 2 January, 12 May, and 15 June 1860; Minutes,
Board of Directors, Dubuque Harbor Company, 29 September 1858,14 and 22
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In contrast, the Dubuque Central Improvement Company
had issued notes directly endorsed by merchants on the back of
the notes, confirming that they would redeem all the paper
money at par. But "when the crash came," as one observer re-
called, "the money was not worth the paper it was printed on."
The merchants who had endorsed the notes "had to redeem
them at par as long as any were outstanding, even after they
were not worth ten cents on the dollar. It caused the failure of
many of the stockholders, merchants, and brokers, and even the
poor laborer." Jesse P. Farley, Robert Waples, Frederick Bissell,
Caleb Booth, Thomas Rogers, Ben Samuels, and O. P. Shiras,
who had no connection with the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad,
were among the merchants hit hardest by the depreciation of
the notes and the failure of the company. By spring 1859, the
Central Company was in "default" and returning land to the
city.
As the panic and its aftermath eroded the structure of the
booster system, the burden of interest payments on the bonds
the city government had issued to support the railroads, delin-
quent taxes unpaid, and declining revenues tightened the eco-
nomic noose around the city government. With the railroad and
improvement companies already in disarray, the third and final
bulwark of the booster ethos was badly undermined. In mid-
1858 a lawsuit by Herman Gelpcke forced the city government
to stop issuing any more railroad bonds. At the same time, the
city "defaulted" on promises to issue bonds for new railroads to
the north and northwest. As government budgets contracted,
government policy retrenched to municipal maintenance and
services.*'
THE CRASH OF 1857 marked a watershed in the political,
economic, and social history of Dubuque and scores of towns
like it across the West. Founded a generation before, they had
January and 10 and 17 December 1859, 6,12, and 14 January 1860,15 January
1865, 8 July 1881, and 28 January 1882; History of Dubuque County, 532.
66. Conzett, "My Recollections of Diibuque," 205; Minutes, Dubuque City
Council, 10 and 21 March 1859.
67. Minutes, Dubuque City Council, 4 October 1858.
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slowly emerged as central places for their surrounding regions.
Boosters firmly believed they could foster local growth and de-
velopment and maintain control over it by husbanding and
developing their local resources and encouraging townspeople
to do the same. Optimistic that such a policy promised their city
a future as a regional entrepôt, boosters threw themselves into
speculative improvements, taking on a heavy public and pri-
vate debt and investing deeply in land during the boom of the
1850s. In the process, they constructed the booster system as a
framework for public policy—patched together by a merging of
public and private capital through negotiations and exchanges
between untested local corporations. They did this on the shaky
foundation of a complex social structure divided into various
factions. Convinced that their future lay in investing their own
capital and supporting each other, they failed to consider the
implications of encumbering local capital to debt from outside
investors. In the enthusiasm of the boom, they spread their in-
vestments across multiple directorates. Their objectivity was
clouded by conflicts of interest and personal friendships. Rely-
ing only on handshakes and promises, they supported each
other in projects beyond their capital base. For a while after out-
side pressure hit the local economy, Dubuque boosters success-
fully used the structure of interlocking directorates and evasive
currency-swapping maneuvers to delay the final reckoning. But
this worked only for so long. In the wake of the financial crisis
of 1857, banks, mercantile houses, manufactories, and improve-
ment companies fell, hundreds went barücrupt, thousands were
thrown out of work, and the city government and countless
residents were "haunted" for years by debt.
By liquidating a decade of investment in farms, businesses,
and railroads, the Paruc of 1857 brought regional development
to a halt until after the Civil War. As Platt Smith feared, not only
in Dubuque but across the region construction stopped, trade
declined, population dropped, and thousands migrated west or
east in search of new opportunities. Whether they stayed or left,
the lives of all of the city's residents were forever changed. The
crisis also disrupted local social development and discredited
the booster ideology. The Panic of 1857 thus marked a turning
point in local and regional life. It would affect subsequent ur-
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ban, social, and cultural development in the Midwest and West
for a generation.*^
For those who stayed, the Dubuque of 1861 would be a new
place. No longer a separate world shaped by boosters' dreams,
Dubuque and other towns like it were but points in a regional
system increasingly dominated by Chicago. These places faced
a slow-growth economy and all the limitations on social, eco-
nomic, and cultural opportunity that implied. Those who were
left without anything found no future in such places. For them,
the "shattered dreams" of the 1850s cast a shadow of stagnation
and decline that lingered for years.""
A core of boosters did remain in Dubuque, in spite of every-
thing. George Wallace Jones, his career in the Senate over, be-
came a minister to Columbia until he was recalled and arrested
for sedition in 1862. He was later exonerated and returned to
Dubuque to live out his days supported by friends until his
death in 1896. Jones survived his adversary Thomas S. Wilson,
who remained active in the bar and then in the memorial cul-
ture of the local bar and fraternal organizations until his death
in 1894. Jones's friend Warner Lewis was "ruined" by the panic
and, because of his southern sympathies, by the Civil War (his
son fought for the Confederacy). Lewis lived out his days as
county recorder, a position his friends acquired for him out of
sympathy. James and Lucius Langworthy both died in early
1865. Solon and Edward, the only Langworthy brothers to sur-
vive the war years, lived into the 1880s, remained active in
business, and cultivated an elite provincial social life, appar-
ently oblivious that their world based on landed wealth was
disappearing. Richard Bonson, Platt Smith, Caleb Booth, H. L.
Stout, and Jesse Farley all pursued increasingly local careers
68. James L. Huston, The Panic of 1857 and tlie Coming of the Civil War (Baton
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with the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad, a regional manifes-
tation of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad that operated in the
shadow of the Illinois Central system. The Dubuque and Sioux
City Railroad, reorgaruzed in 1864 under the control of the Illi-
nois Central, became an institutional vestige of the old local
elite, with a historical connection to Iowans who had gone to
Washington, D.C., or who became members of a regional bar,
railroad, and business elite in the 1870s. Booth, Stout, and Far-
ley remained active and continued as the local operators, de-
fending it from a number of takeover attempts through legal
efforts through 1887. In the course of fighting, they gradually
recogruzed how powerless they were, as a small company in a
world of systems run from New York and Chicago. Increasingly
convinced that small and locally owned was better, they articu-
lated a viewpoint in response to the railroads that would con-
tribute to the development of a populist small-town ideology
across the Midwest during the 1870s and 1880s.™
Most Dubuque boosters of the 1850s left the city in search of
a new start. William Bamey, Lincoln Clark, and many others
migrated to Chicago. Clark struggled unsuccessfially for a few
years and then retired to Massachusetts. Bamey continued in
the law and the land business; he also remained active in the
operation of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad. Like George
Wallace Jones, Denrüs A. Mahony was arrested for sedition and
imprisoned—a story he told in his wartime book, TJje Prisoner of
State. Upon his release, Mahony retumed to Dubuque, then
moved for a time to St. Louis where he worked as a newspaper
editor. When he died in 1879, he was living again in Dubuque.
Franc B. Wilkie, who arrived destitute from Davenport to work
with Mahony in 1858, followed the Dubuque boys into the war
in Missouri, became a war correspondent first for the New York
Times and then for the Chicago Times. After the war, Wilkie
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moved to Chicago and became a prominent newspaperman
and writer. Major Richard Mobley, destitute from his failure in
1857, moved to Washington and held a series of modest gov-
errunent positions, becoming part of the "Iowa Colony" there
until his return home in 1878. William Vandever, elected to Con-
gress in the Republican upsurge of 1858, took a company of Du-
buque men into the war and rose through the ranks to brigadier-
general. Like so many Iowans, he returned to find limited op-
portmuties in the "old town," became a "railroad man," served
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs in New Mexico and Arizona
territories, and entered the mining business in New York before
migrating to Ventura County, California, in the 1870s. He was
elected to Congress in the 1880s.^ '
Whether they stayed or left, each member of the booster
elite who had experienced the frenetic rise of the "palmy days"
of the 1850s and then the panic and recession of 1857 under-
stood with each passing year the growing distance between
their city and the "way of the town" they had lived in before the
Civil War. In the years to come they would play a central role in
constructing a new national middle class in Gilded Age America.
71. Lincoln Clark Papers; New York Office, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, In-
Letters, October 1867-1887; D. A. Mahony, The Prisoner of State (New York,
1863); Wilkie, Personal Reminiscences; Franc B. Wilkie, Tlie Iowa First: Letters from
tlie YJar (Dubuque, 1861); Richard Martin, "First Regiment Iowa Volunteers,"
Palimpsest 46 (1965), 5-6; Helen Wulkow, "Dubuque in the Civil War Period,"
(Ph.D. diss.. Northwestern University, 1941); Thomas W. Hurm, "Dennis Ma-
hony, Iowa Copperhead" (Ph.D. diss.. Catholic University, 1966); Stiles, Recol-
lections and Sketches, 819,132-34; Conzett, "My Recollections of Dubuque," 248;
Childs, History of Dubuque County, 850; William Vandever Papers, University of
Dubuque.

